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ABSTRACT 
Autonomy plays a central role in bioethics, but there is no consensus as to how we 
should understand this concept. This paper critically considers three different conceptions 
of autonomy: the default conception prevalent in bioethics literature; a broader procedural 
account of autonomy drawing moral philosophical approaches; and a substantive, 
perfectionist account. Building on Rebecca Walker’s critique of the default conception of 
autonomy, we will argue that a substantive, perfectionist approach both fulfils Walker’s 
criteria for a conception of autonomy in bioethics and lends itself to application in practical 
scenarios. In so doing, we draw on scenarios from genomic medicine to show that a 
substantive, perfectionist approach not only offers a more conceptually adequate 
understanding of autonomy in more complex cases, but also lends itself to practical 
application by helping health professionals identify how they can maximize people’s 
capacity to exercise their autonomy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of autonomy plays a central role in bioethics1, but there is no consensus 
as to how we should understand it. The conception of autonomy deployed in applied ethics2 
can have crucial ramifications when it is applied in real world scenarios, so it is important to 
be clear. However this clarity is often lacking when autonomy is discussed in the bioethics 
literature. In this paper we outline three different conceptions of autonomy, and argue that 
a substantive, perfectionist approach meets the theoretical requirements for an account of 
autonomy and also provides practical guidance. As Rebecca Walker argues, bioethics 
requires a more conceptually adequate account of autonomy than the default conception. 
We will draw on her requirements for a theory of autonomy, but will also suggest how this 
approach can be relevant to practical scenarios. If patient autonomy is to be respected in 
real-world situations then we need to have an account of autonomy that allows us to know 
both how to respect it, and when we have successfully done so.  
Although widely debated in the literature, one of the most influential accounts of 
autonomy is derived from Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics. We will 
refer to this as the default conception, as it tends to be the assumed understanding of 
autonomy in bioethics when one is not otherwise specified. We will follow Walker’s critique 
of this account and draw on scenarios from genomic medicine to highlight the importance 
of a broader view3.  
                                                      
1 Since the literature refers to bioethics, biomedical ethics and medical ethics variably, it is not straightforward 
to use these terms clearly. We will use the term bioethics to refer to the ethical analysis of issues arising in the 
health and medical sciences which have a moral dimension. We recognize that the term “medical ethics” is 
often taken to refer to ethical issues arising specifically in medical practice, and “biomedical ethics” is 
restricted to ethical issues arising in health care more broadly, however for the purposes of this paper there 
are no significant difference between these terms and “bioethics”. Hence we will favour the term bioethics but 
use all three interchangeably when the literature we cite does so. 
2 We recognize that the term “applied ethics” can be understood as straightforwardly applying moral theories 
to real-world scenarios, and consequently that the term “practical ethics” is sometimes used to indicate 
practical consideration of ethical issues. Despite this critique, we prefer the term “applied ethics” as it is more 
widely accepted. 
3 A note on terminology: by a broader account of autonomy we mean one that incorporates elements more 
fully developed in the moral philosophical literature, such as self-determination, critical reflection, 
authenticity, and that is sensitive to the person’s social and relational context. Broad conceptions are distinct 
from a “narrow” understanding of autonomy, which focuses on informed consent as the process to achieve 
autonomy. 
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In pursuit of a more conceptually robust account of autonomy, we then consider 
procedural accounts, which determine the criteria for autonomy in terms of the process or 
procedure by which autonomy is exercised. These accounts are content-neutral in that the 
determination of whether a person has acted autonomously does not require any reference 
to the content of their action or decision, only the procedure by which they made it. 
Drawing primarily on Gerald Dworkin, we show that while such approaches address some 
concerns, their content neutrality is problematic for bioethics. Procedural conceptions of 
autonomy are distinguished from substantive accounts, which require some reflection on 
the content or substance of a person’s actions or decisions. 
Finally, we argue for a substantive, perfectionist account, based on Raz’s conception 
of autonomy; one that incorporates the notion of normative competence. Normative 
competence refers to the ability of individuals to evaluate the different options or choices 
available to them by reflecting critically on their normative content. Such a substantive 
approach not only meets Walker’s criteria for a theory of autonomy, it also provides 
practical guidance for how to respect autonomy in healthcare scenarios. 
 
THE DEFAULT ACCOUNT OF AUTONOMY IN BIOETHICS 
The principle of respect for autonomy is one of the central tenets of bioethics. While 
the importance of respecting patients and obtaining their consent was implicitly evident in 
the early bioethics literature (including foundational documents such as the Declaration of 
Geneva (World Medical Association 1948), the International Code of Medical Ethics (World 
Medical Association 1949), and the Belmont Report (National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research1979), it was in Beauchamp and 
Childress’s influential book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, first published in 1979 and now in 
its seventh edition (Beauchamp and Childress 2013) that the principle of respect for 
autonomy was more clearly specified. While this paper will not debate the validity of the 
four principles of biomedical ethics as articulated by these authors – respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice – it is generally acknowledged that they have 
been influential in the bioethical discourse. Hence the concept of autonomy, while often not 
clarified, has a tendency in the bioethics literature to default to the one articulated by 
Beauchamp and Childress. For example, Hodgson & Spriggs in their articulation of a practical 
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account of autonomy for genetic counselling, do not define how they understand the term 
‘autonomous choices’, the facilitation of which is one of the aims of genetic counselling. In 
another example, Bunnik et al examine the tension between new genomic and genetic tests 
and the principle of respecting patient autonomy. However their analysis focuses on the 
role of information in informed consent rather than autonomy per se (Bunnik et al. 2013). 
This tacit equating of autonomy and informed consent4 is not unusual in bioethics, and Hildt 
recognizes the tendency in medicine to emphasize a narrow conception of autonomy, that 
focuses on provision of information (Hildt 2009). 
Beauchamp and Childress’s theory of autonomy emphasizes three conditions that 
must be met in order for a decision to be autonomous: intentionality, understanding and 
noncontrol (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Intentionality means that the decision or 
action cannot be accidental; an agent has to intend to act in that way, it must be a 
deliberate action. The requirement for understanding says that the agent must have a 
sufficient grasp of the relevant facts and information in order to make the decision or take 
that action. While Beauchamp and Childress consider intentionality to be a binary property, 
understanding can vary in degrees. Due to this variability of understanding, a threshold 
must be specified as the acceptable level of understanding required in order for the action 
to be considered autonomous (and who should make this specification?). The third 
condition for autonomy is referred to as ‘noncontrol’, which means freedom from either 
external or internal controls. External controls include coercion or other undue influence by 
another person, while internal controls are mental states such as addiction or some forms 
of mental disorder that can interfere with decision making processes. Similar to the 
requirement for understanding, noncontrol is a scalar property, so a certain level 
(threshold) of noncontrol is needed in order for an action or decision to be considered 
autonomous. 
The default conception of autonomy emphasizes the requirement that patients or 
research subjects not be coerced, unduly influenced, asked to decide with insufficient 
information, and so on. In other words, it is a primarily negative conception of autonomy 
since it focuses on what we must refrain from doing if we are to respect autonomy. 
                                                      
4 Notwithstanding this assumption, both these papers make valuable contributions to considerations of 
consent for genomic testing. 
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Beauchamp and Childress do also consider health professionals’ positive obligations to 
respect autonomy, which includes a requirement to undertake “actions that foster 
autonomous decision making” (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 107) and the disclosure of 
relevant information.  They focus primarily on what patients or research subjects need in 
order to decide autonomously, and doing so leads to an emphasis on decisions and how 
they are influenced. They turn their focus to mechanisms that can prevent undue influence, 
lack of information, and so on, thereby giving a detailed account of the requirements for 
informed consent. For Beauchamp and Childress, the requirement to respect autonomous 
choices provides the justification for informed consent procedures, and in fact they go so far 
as to say that “The basic paradigm of the exercise of autonomy in health care and in 
research is express or explicit consent (or refusal), usually informed consent (or refusal)” (p. 
110). 
Although this approach has its shortcomings (which are explored below), there are 
also benefits. There is no doubt that the negative requirements that obligate medical 
practitioners and researchers not to coerce, deceive, manipulate, or otherwise unduly 
influence patients and research participants are ethically important. Informed consent 
procedures, at a minimum, go towards reducing undue deception or coercion of patients, 
which has clear benefits. Such procedures also lend themselves well to practical application; 
they are concrete processes that institutions, medical practitioners and researchers can 
develop and implement, to fulfil certain ethical obligations to patients and research 
participants. In addition, Beauchamp and Childress’ tripartite requirements for autonomy 
very closely match many jurisdictions’ legal standards for informed consent, which allows 
health professionals (rightly or wrongly) to claim they are achieving ethical and legal 
practice concurrently. 
However, this focus on processes and the negative obligations on health 
professionals has led to a narrowing of the concept of autonomy. Both the importance and 
ready implementation of Beauchamp and Childress’ account of autonomy have contributed 
to its prevalence in medical ethics (Walker 2008), but this has come at the expense of a 
broader, more conceptually adequate understanding of the nature of autonomy. Informed 
consent, for Beauchamp and Childress, is the mechanism by which patient autonomy is 
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respected, but our contention is that there is more to autonomy than intentionality, 
understanding and noncontrol.  
We will now outline Rebecca Walker’s critique of this default conception of 
autonomy and her argument that a different concept of autonomy is required in bioethics. 
However, while accepting Walker’s argument, we will reassess her conclusion that this is 
too hard to translate into practice. We draw on developments in genomic medicine to claim 
instead that autonomy, broadly understood, can be applicable to bioethics by considering 
the role that information plays in fostering autonomy. After this we will address concerns 
about procedural accounts of autonomy in an attempt to defend a substantive, perfectionist 
understanding of autonomy, one that both offers a conceptually adequate account of 
autonomy and can be of practical use in applied contexts. 
 
Walker’s Critique of the Default Conception: Failures of Self-Rule 
Rebecca Walker (Walker 2008) has provided a set of criteria for assessing 
conceptions of autonomy.  
She suggests that an adequate conception of autonomy should be able to do the 
following: 
(1) Identify non-autonomous actions 
(2) Explain what makes choices or actions autonomous 
(3) Account for why we ought (morally) to respect autonomy. 
Walker argues that medical ethics needs a new concept of autonomy, because what 
she calls “the common view of autonomy” (p. 595), which she identifies as the prevailing 
view as set forward by Beauchamp and Childress, fails in three important ways. To illustrate 
these failures, she makes use of three “problem cases” that demonstrate how the default 
conception of autonomy fails to meet the above criteria. In her scenarios, Beauchamp and 
Childress’ requirements for autonomy are met, yet the patient fails to be autonomous:  
(a) “Weak-willed William” who does not follow his physical therapy regime after knee 
surgery, despite his intentions to do so and his understanding of the consequences;  
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(b) “Desiree,” a woman who strongly endorses feminist values and considers plastic 
surgery unacceptable, yet experiences an overwhelming desire to undergo plastic 
surgery herself to the point that she approaches a surgeon; and  
(c) “Tim,” a cancer patient with strong chances of survival only if he undergoes 
immediate treatment, who refuses treatment due to a temporary loss of the will to 
live, which he acknowledges as such. (Walker 2008 597-598) 
In each of the cases, a person makes a decision5 which is inconsistent with their 
values, long-term goals and preferences due to an impulsive or short-lived desire. However, 
each choice is made by a person who has a sufficient degree of understanding of the 
relevant facts, as well as their own values and goals, and who is not subject to the kinds of 
internal or external controls that contribute to a failure to be autonomous. In other words, 
they are intentional (each person acts deliberately), the patients all understand the relevant 
information, and none of them are being coerced; so they all meet Beauchamp and 
Childress’ criteria for autonomous decisions. These decisions are the result of a different 
kind of problem with internal control, one not captured by Beauchamp and Childress’ 
account of autonomy.  
The inability of the default conception of autonomy to identify these actions as non-
autonomous relates to the content-free nature of this understanding of autonomy. That is, 
this view of autonomy does not require any consideration of the content or substance of 
the actions, only the process or procedure by which they were decided. Walker argues that 
some decisions that are subject to internal controls would be considered autonomous. Her 
argument is that the nature of the internal control is what matters. Some internal factors 
which control people’s choices and actions – such as oppression or weakness of will – would 
render the resulting actions non-autonomous. However other internal factors are central to 
a person’s conception of self, and actions controlled by such factors – for example love for 
one’s child, or a moral principle – would be considered autonomous. We will return to the 
shortcomings of content-free conceptions of autonomy in Section 0, as it is also a key 
problem with procedural accounts of autonomy. 
                                                      
5 For the purposes of this paper, there is not a substantive distinction between the terms “decision” and 
“choice”. Although one might be more relevant or applicable in a given context than another, we will use them 
more or less interchangeably. 
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Walker also identifies another important reason why the default conception of 
autonomy has failed to identify the non-autonomous actions in her problem cases, namely 
that this view mostly tends to consider autonomy as a property of choices or decisions. In 
her problem cases, the person is taken to be otherwise autonomous, but their choice in this 
instance is not autonomous because it fails (in various ways) to reflect the agent’s authentic 
goals and preferences. It is important to emphasize that Beauchamp and Childress outline 
conditions for autonomous decisions, not persons. The literature tends to apply the term 
autonomy in different ways; it has been used most often in the medical ethics literature as a 
property of decisions or choices (Wilson 2007, Beauchamp and Childress 2013), as opposed 
to a property of persons which is more prevalent in the moral philosophical literature 
(Dworkin 1988, Frankfurt 1971). In discussions of autonomous persons, their lives are 
sometimes referred to as having (or not) the property of autonomy, and on a robust Kantian 
interpretation, autonomy is considered as a property of ‘willing’ and principles for action 
(O'Neill 2002). Application of the term in such different ways has contributed to imprecision 
in how it is used. 
The treatment of autonomy in medical ethics as – predominantly – a property of 
decisions secured by informed consent has made it more difficult for medical ethics to align 
with the broader (but largely separate) philosophical debate about the concept of 
autonomy as a property of persons or agents. The core business of medical ethics is to 
connect theory and practice in a meaningful way (Jennings 2016). One important task in this 
field is to synthesize the rich moral and political philosophy literature that informs a concept 
such as autonomy in a way that facilitates its application in the medical context. The 
disconnect between autonomy as a property of persons, as it is generally conceived in the 
philosophical literature, and as a property of decisions in the medical context poses a 
problem in making this translation. The lack of a single approach has made the 
requirements for autonomy in practical contexts more difficult to discern. 
Walker claims that the failure of the currently dominant conception of autonomy in 
bioethics is symptomatic of a more general phenomenon, namely that conceptually 
adequate accounts of autonomy are not readily applicable to practical issues in 
biomedicine. We will argue against this conclusion, and show instead that a broader 
conception of autonomy requires an emphasis on more factors than just informed consent 
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processes, which is where the default conception naturally leads. Examining the role of 
information and the nature of the communicative interchanges between patients and 
clinicians in which consent is given or refused is a more fruitful way of respecting patient 
autonomy. Such an approach lends itself to a broader notion of autonomy that refers to the 
patient’s social and relational context, and emphasizes the authenticity of their preferences 
and critical reflection upon their wider goals. We argue that this shift of focus is how a 
conception of autonomy that is adequate by Walker’s criteria can also be useful in practice. 
 
The Role of Information 
A significant problem with the default conception of autonomy, with its focus on 
understanding, is that it emphasizes provision of information to patients. In the context of 
informed consent processes, this is often taken to be a requirement to provide maximum 
amounts of information. Information provision is a particularly relevant consideration in 
genomic testing, where the volume and dynamic nature of possible findings mean that a 
person can never be ‘informed’ in the manner that Beauchamp and Childress would 
advocate as necessary. The argument that the requirement to respect autonomy provides 
the justification for informed consent reinforces the obligation to provide information. 
Beauchamp and Childress specify that respecting autonomy “obligates professionals in 
health care… to disclose information, to probe for and ensure understanding” (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013, 107). As outlined above, with informed consent taken to be the 
mechanism by which autonomy is respected there is a focus in applied contexts on 
providing information as a means of ensuring patients have enough information to make an 
informed decision. The emphasis on information provision was not necessarily Beauchamp 
and Childress’ intent, however it has been a practical effect of their influential account of 
autonomy. 
It has been disputed whether provision of comprehensive information is a necessary 
requirement for autonomy. Tom Walker (2013) queries the necessity of requiring a fully 
informed consent in order to respect patient autonomy. His argument is relevant because if 
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comprehensive information6 is not the key to respecting patients’ autonomy, then this lends 
weight to our contention that the emphasis on providing substantial (and increasing) 
amounts of information is not necessary for autonomy, and could actually be 
counterproductive to enhancing patient autonomy. Tom Walker claims that while only an 
autonomous patient can give informed consent, the requirement to respect autonomous 
choices does not imply a requirement to obtain fully informed consent. 
On the default conception of autonomy in bioethics, the mechanism for respecting 
autonomy is informed consent. Therefore, an informed consent process must take place in 
order to produce an autonomous choice or decision, and this choice is what ought to be 
respected. Walker tests this approach by considering how to proceed if a patient has not 
made an autonomous choice. If the patient has not (or cannot) made an informed choice, 
then there is no guidance for the health professional because there is no autonomous 
choice that they are obliged to respect. For example, if a patient refuses a treatment that 
they do not understand, then a health professional (arguably, on the default conception) has 
no obligation to respect that choice. If a choice is not adequately informed, then it cannot 
be autonomous. Walker also acknowledges Beauchamp and Childress’s additional (positive) 
requirement that doctors have an obligation to foster autonomous decision-making. This 
obligation translates into a requirement for doctors to provide the information required to 
make an adequately informed decision to consent to or refuse treatment. This requirement 
is distinct from the obligation to respect autonomous choices. Walker’s contention is that 
the requirement to respect autonomous choices does not in itself confer on health 
professionals an obligation to secure an autonomous decision. 
A key problem that Walker (like Rebecca Walker) has identified is the slippage 
between autonomy as a property of the person, and autonomy as a characteristic of a 
particular choice. Respecting the autonomy of a person is not the same as respecting their 
autonomous choices. Tom Walker’s contention is that in order to respect a person’s 
autonomy, it is only their consent that is required, not their informed consent. He argues 
that in order to consent to a treatment, a patient requires a general understanding of what 
will happen to them, but not the comprehensive risk benefit analysis that is often required 
                                                      
6 Walker’s argument relates to the provision of information “over and above information about what in 
general terms is to be done to them”, such as comprehensive information about the risks and benefits of a 
proposed procedure, alternatives, and so on. 
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under formalized informed consent procedures7. Walker’s argument is consistent with 
O’Neill’s contention not to provide extensive amounts of information (O'Neill 2003). She 
argues that in order to support the goals of informed consent, information needs to be 
provided in a way that is flexible and responsive to patients’ desires for varying amounts of 
information. On this approach, patients are provided with a general overview of the 
proposed intervention, and have the opportunity to seek more information if they choose. 
Tom Walker’s argument that consent rather than informed consent is what matters 
when it comes to respecting patients’ autonomy highlights a key problem that arises when 
autonomy is understood as a property of choices or decisions. If autonomy is taken to be a 
property of choices – which must be informed choices – this leads to a requirement to 
provide escalating (if not limitless) amounts of information to ensure that the choice is fully 
informed, and hence autonomous. Given that autonomy is a scalar property, there is an 
implication that the more information is provided, the more autonomous the decision 
becomes. While some amount of information is necessary in order to consent to a medical 
intervention, an autonomous person should be able to access the amount of information 
that they feel they require in order to make a decision. As demonstrated by increasingly 
complex informed consent requirements,8 too much information can have a confounding 
effect and actually undermine the patient’s understanding or ability to absorb the 
information. 
Manson and O’Neill (2007) identify the drive to provide increasing amounts of 
information as the product of a series of misconceptions about communication. They argue 
that a focus on understanding the pertinent features of communicative transfers can shape 
a more effective method for informed consent. On their view, it is more fruitful to focus on 
the communicative and epistemic norms that underpin our communicative interactions 
with other agents, rather than the transfer of information. The focus on providing 
information has arisen in the context of certain metaphors about communication that 
                                                      
7 By contrast, the Declaration of Helsinki which safeguards the rights of human participants in medical research 
sets out in Article 26 a comprehensive list of the information which should be provided to research 
participants, some of which is detailed scientific and institutional information related to the study which might 
not increase research participants understanding of the likely impact on them of participation. 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html accessed 19/08/16. 
8 See, for example, the sample consent forms for genomic research provided by the US National Institutes of 
Health, available at: https://www.genome.gov/27559023/informed-consent-sample-consent-forms/ (accessed 
23/03/2017). 
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Manson and O’Neill call the conduit/ container metaphors, which describe information as 
‘stuff’ that can be held in a container (such as a document or a person) and transferred to 
another receptacle. In contrast to this metaphor, they argue that informing and 
communicating occur in communicative acts that depend on a detailed set of 
communicative and epistemic norms. These norms tend to be obscured by the prevailing 
metaphors about information and communication. Communicative acts are context-
dependent, and take place against the background of the knowledge and attitudes of both 
the speaker and audience. They are fundamentally interactive and require the engagement 
of both parties. On such a view, the quantity of information provided is not the most 
relevant feature of the exchange. Rather, ensuring proper consent requires a focus on the 
appropriate kind of interaction between the patient and clinician. Similarly, the quantity of 
information cannot be taken to be an indicator of the patient’s degree of autonomy. We will 
argue that factors such as whether the patient’s choices appropriately reflect his or her 
authentically held goals and preferences are more relevant instead. Of course some 
information is required to make such a determination, but the process will vary for each 
patient and their preferred approach. 
The problem with providing too much information is also related to the issue of 
choices. In explicating his perfectionist theory of the requirements for the capacity to live 
autonomously, Raz (1986) identifies the availability of an adequate range of options as one 
of the conditions. He argues that a greater number of options are not necessarily desirable, 
what is important is that there are enough options that differ in important ways. Too many 
options can actually undermine autonomy, because of what Dworkin refers to as the 
‘transaction costs’ of making a decision (Dworkin 1988). If a substantial number of options 
are offered to a patient, then they must invest a significant amount of time and effort to 
acquire enough information to make a reasonable or rational choice, and then go through 
the process of evaluating all the options to make the choice. Subsequent to making such a 
decision, a person might be plagued by doubt as to whether they have made the correct 
choice. A patient faced with a medical decision is already likely to be stressed and 
vulnerable, so the process of working through the information required to assess a broad 
range of options could represent a burden to them rather than enhancing their autonomy. 
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Autonomy in the Genomics Context 
We can see the shortcomings of focusing on the provision of information as a way to 
respect patient autonomy in medical decision making in some areas of medicine such as 
genomics. The default model of respecting autonomy via informed consent requires health 
practitioners to disclose all relevant information to the patient, including details about their 
condition, options for testing and treatment, likely outcomes of proposed interventions, the 
limitations and risks of interventions, and so on. Bunnik et al (2013) argue that even for 
genetic tests in relation to a single condition, this represents a significant amount of 
information to process, and requires several counselling sessions. However for genomic 
testing, which involves looking at many genes at once and which can include looking at 
every expressed gene or the whole genome (and which can also give rise to dynamic or 
uncertain information), adequately informed consent in its traditional form quickly becomes 
a practically impossible goal. Genomic testing that may identify additional variants (of either 
known or unknown significance) complicates provision of pre-test information. Appelbaum 
et al propose four different models for informed consent in genomics (Appelbaum et al. 
2014) which take varying approaches to informing patients of the breadth of possible 
incidental findings, including when, how and by whom the information is provided. 
The difficulty of providing adequate information in genomics has been recognized. 
For instance, in its 2013 recommendations on reporting incidental findings, the American 
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, whose 2013 policy statement  states: 
To respect preferences in the same manner as with targeted testing, the 
patient whose exome or genome is sequenced would have to undergo an extensive, 
and possibly overwhelming, amount of genetic counselling for numerous conditions 
unrelated to the primary indication for sequencing. (Green et al. 2013, 568) 
While these recommendations are controversial for other reasons and have since 
been softened, this comment demonstrates recognition by practitioners in genomics that 
providing comprehensive information – or even sufficient information to grasp the potential 
outcome of sequencing – is an impractical notion in this context. Similarly, Koenig explains 
that when the human genome was first mapped the Clinton administration’s Advisory 
Committee on Genetic Testing stated that when genomic testing became widespread “the 
ideal of full disclosure… would collapse” (Koenig 2014 33). 
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To illustrate this, consider Amendola et al’s example of a sixteen month-old boy 
diagnosed with a brain tumor (Amendola et al. 2015). His family were recruited to a study 
involving somatic tumor and germline whole exome sequencing in childhood cancer 
patients. The results returned to participants included: tumor-specific variants with clinical 
utility (i.e. capacity to influence clinical care); variants in cancer susceptibility genes that are 
either pathogenic or have uncertain significance; and other ‘incidental’ findings that are 
medically actionable. In this child’s case there were no tumor-specific variants that could 
impact his clinical cancer care, nor were there any (known) pathogenic variants in genes 
associated with cancer predispositions. However, the child did have a maternally inherited 
pathogenic variant in the SCN5A gene that has a known association with Long QT syndrome, 
a rare heart condition. These results had several implications for the family: both the child 
and his mother were referred to cardiology for assessment and ongoing follow up. 
Cardiology evaluation determined that the child was “genotype positive, phenotype 
negative” – namely that he had no indication of cardiac symptoms. In addition, the lack of a 
clinically significant tumor-specific variant meant that the child’s cancer care should proceed 
as originally planned.  
This example highlights the layers of informational complexity that can arise in the 
context of genomics, and the implications that can arise for other members of a patient’s 
family. It would not have been plausible for the clinical team to conduct an informed 
consent process that covered all the possible findings that could have arisen as a result of 
the blood and tumor exome sequencing9. However, in the process of pre-test and post-test 
clinical interactions, the healthcare team had opportunities to find out what was important 
to the family. The father expressed that his chief concern was whether the tumor-specific 
exome sequencing would find a variant associated with chemotherapy resistance, and since 
this was not found his primary response to the test results was relief. Regarding the 
incidental finding, this case shows the importance of communicating to patients (and, 
where appropriate, their families) the potential variation and uncertainty of genetic results. 
                                                      
9 It is recognized that this case is problematic for several reasons, including uncertainty about the penetrance 
of the genetic variant associated with LongQT syndrome. It is therefore subject to debate whether this finding 
should have been returned in the absence of a family history. However, this complexity is out of scope for the 
purposes of the current discussion. 
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When considering what would constitute adequate information to make a fully 
informed choice before undergoing genomic testing, there are several characteristics of the 
information that need to be discussed. Genomic information can be voluminous and highly 
complex, but it can also be ambiguous. It almost always requires interpretation to be 
meaningful. Newson et al (2016) propose a definition of ‘genomic uncertainty’ that arises 
both from the characteristics of the information itself – particularly its probabilistic nature, 
ambiguous implications, and complexity – and also from how the clinician or patient 
interprets or understands that information. Interpretation of results from genomic testing is 
mostly based on analyses of large population databases that are neither representative nor 
complete. A further dimension of complexity is that results are typically probabilistic in 
nature. While people can generally grasp probabilistic reasoning, it can be difficult to make 
sense of the implications of a probabilistic result when it is layered with other dimensions of 
complexity and ambiguity.  An identified variation might be thought to be correlated with a 
certain phenotype or predisposition, but the penetrance can be variable and the strength of 
the correlation imprecisely known. To maximize the patient’s capacity to be autonomous, 
the inherent uncertainty of genomic findings must be acknowledged and appraised in the 
medical decision making process, and in particular in the communication between clinicians, 
patients, and their families. 
The breadth of possible results is also difficult to communicate to patients. As in the 
example of testing the sixteen month-old given above, if testing is undertaken in an attempt 
to explain a known condition, without significant filtering of data10 there is always the 
possibility of identifying a variant unrelated to the condition or of unknown significance. 
Since in this case the child did not display a phenotype for the supposedly medically 
actionable finding of the genetic variant associated with Long QT syndrome, the typical 
notion of medical test results being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news does not seem to fit. Rather, 
clinicians have an opportunity and responsibility to help patients understand how to 
respond to results. 
                                                      
10 It is recognized that some filtering of data is inevitable in all genomic sequencing. While one approach can 
be to target testing to ensure the findings are relevant to the core clinical question, there remains a possibility 
that unrelated variants will be found. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss different approaches to 
filtering in genomic testing.  
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We have argued that the idea of providing enough information to allow patients to 
make an adequately informed decision is neither practical nor desirable, and is nearly 
impossible in the context of genomics. There is also empirical evidence that patients do not 
wish to be overwhelmed by excessive information (Brothers et al. 2016). In considering how 
we ought to respond to genomic uncertainty, Newson et al (2016) point out that while 
genomic testing is often sought with the goal of reducing uncertainty, it can fail to do so and 
might introduce new kinds of uncertainty. They argue that uncertainty should not be 
treated as something negative that we should seek to eliminate, and that it should be 
acknowledged both prior to and after genomic testing. They highlight the importance of 
engaging with the various forms of uncertainty at all stages of testing, and of health 
professionals working with patients to identify responses to different kinds of uncertainty. 
They emphasize the importance of building resilience and promoting patients’ welfare, 
while acknowledging the complexity of communication in the context of genomic testing. 
They point out that enabling patients to choose autonomously requires health professionals 
to engage in a more interactive discussion with patients to facilitate their decision making 
process, rather than providing them with the relevant information and leaving them to 
decide. Approaching genomic testing via the concept of uncertainty serves to highlight the 
shortcomings of the default conception of autonomy, which relies heavily on a traditional 
informed consent model. This approach does not allow for a value-neutral engagement 
between patient and practitioner around the uncertainties that exist prior to genomic 
testing, and which might arise following it, because choices about how to present 
information and options make a difference. 
We have seen that the default conception of autonomy in biomedical ethics, and its 
associated focus on information provision, is highly problematic in the context of genomic 
medicine due to the complexity of the information being sought and disclosed and the 
different dimensions of uncertainty of genomic information. Rebecca Walker’s critique of 
this conception of autonomy also highlights the shortcomings of taking autonomy to be a 
property of decisions. Using a procedural account of autonomy, which emphasizes (among 
other aspects) the importance to autonomy of a critical process of self-reflection, may 
provide a viable alternative.  
 
17 
 
PROCEDURAL ACCOUNTS OF AUTONOMY 
As outlined above, the focus in biomedical ethics on negative obligations of 
healthcare professionals has led to the dominance of informed consent processes as the 
mechanism by which patient autonomy is respected.11 Having argued that this default 
conception of autonomy falls short in several ways, we will now consider a broader 
philosophical account of autonomy and how it can be applied in bioethics. We focus on 
(Gerald) Dworkin’s account (Dworkin 1988) as a notable and influential example of this type 
of theory. Dworkin is not the sole proponent of such a view, but his and Frankfurt’s 
(Frankfurt 1971) are among the more prominent accounts of autonomy as a capacity of 
persons based on a procedural approach. 
 
Dworkin’s Autonomy 
Dworkin provides a selected sample of uses of the word  ‘autonomy’ to illustrate the 
imprecision of the concept’s use. It has been variously described as freedom (both ‘freedom 
to’ and ‘freedom from’), sovereignty over oneself, a combination of freedom and 
responsibility, a characteristic requiring rational reflection about rules, an ability to choose 
how to think and act, freedom from obligation, and being ultimately responsible for one’s 
own decisions (Dworkin 1988). Dworkin goes on to outline the desirable qualities of a theory 
of autonomy, which include logical consistency, empirical possibility and ideological 
neutrality. An adequate account should also explain why autonomy is considered valuable, 
and must be relevant to both the moral principles and the judgements (whether empirical, 
normative or conceptual) that we make about autonomy. These features identified by 
Dworkin are reflected in Rebecca Walker’s third requirement, namely that an account of 
autonomy should explain why we ought (morally) to respect it.12 Building on these 
requirements, Dworkin develops the following definition: 
[A]utonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect 
critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the 
                                                      
11 That is, the emphasis has been on what healthcare practitioners should avoid doing – namely coercing 
patients or allowing them to make uninformed decisions. 
12 The question of why, morally, we ought to respect autonomy is important but is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences 
and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning 
and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are. 
(Dworkin 1988, 20) 
This is a robust definition of autonomy as a property of persons, and despite some 
debate13 it remains relevant today as a basis for our understanding of the concept of 
autonomy. We will argue for an account of autonomy that differs from Dworkin’s in that it 
takes the content of decisions and actions into account. 
Dworkin is clear that autonomy is a property of persons or agents (rather than of 
decisions). and this clarity in itself goes some way to enabling a more specific understanding 
of the concept. On his view, failures of self-rule such as those in Walker’s problem cases 
above could be corrected through the process of critical reflection and adjustment. Her 
“weak-willed William”, upon realizing that he was not following through with his therapy 
regime, could examine his beliefs and desires – which all support him doing the exercises – 
and consider the reasons why he is not doing the therapy. It could be that he has too great a 
need for rest, other competing priorities, or other desires that are stronger than his desire 
to achieve the benefits of the prescribed therapy. He could then either seek to adjust his 
first-order desires in light of his higher-order preference for a full recovery, or if he is unable 
to do this he might need to seek some support to ensure he does the exercises. Similarly, 
Desiree who seeks plastic surgery despite her strongly held feminist values, might discover 
through a process of critical reflection that in addition to her negative beliefs about plastic 
surgery she also has certain desires (for example, to look a certain way) that have prompted 
her to approach a plastic surgeon. By considering the tension between her values, goals and 
desires she could work through her priorities to determine the most preferable course of 
action for her. This would be the one that most closely reflects her total set of values and is 
most likely, on balance, to help her achieve her authentic goals.  
A broader understanding of autonomy is also helpful in the context of genomics, 
given the inherent uncertainty in genomic information. Consider a woman who is seeking 
genomic testing, as she has a strong family history of various cancers with no familial 
                                                      
13 Key criticisms of Dworkin’s account include the problem of infinite regress, the emphasis on the individual, 
and its content neutrality – all of which are addressed later in this paper. 
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mutation yet identified. On the default conception of autonomy, it would be beneficial to 
outline a comprehensive range of possible results of this test, to enable her to make 
informed decisions about relevant screening and preventive interventions. However, 
conversations with the woman might also reveal that her underlying motivation for seeking 
genomic testing is to reduce her anxiety, a motivation that might not be satisfied by 
untargeted sequencing. In this case, her request for genomic testing is motivated by a first-
order desire to reduce uncertainty, based on a higher-order desire to take action to reduce 
her chances of being diagnosed with cancer herself. Further exploration of her underlying 
desires and the impact (if any) that the testing could have on the uncertainty she feels, 
could enable her and her geneticist to formulate an alternative plan that more effectively 
meets her preferences, than unfettered information provision might do.14 
Considering how these types of cases play out in order to safeguard the patients’ 
autonomy illustrates why we should focus on the autonomy of persons rather than 
decisions. Each of the decisions made by Walker’s subjects meets Beauchamp and Childress’ 
requirements of being intentional, informed and not controlled in the sense required for the 
default conception of autonomy. But, Walker’s examples are problematic on Dworkin’s 
view, because the choices do not align with the subjects’ long-held values and preferences. 
They also match our intuition that the individuals are not acting autonomously. This 
demonstrates the strength of Dworkin’s conception of autonomy. On his criteria, these 
autonomous people have failed to exercise their autonomy in this instance, as they have not 
engaged in sufficiently critical reflection and adjustment of their goals, beliefs and 
preferences into a coherent set. If they had done so, then that process would constitute an 
explanation for why the choice could be considered autonomous.  
This process of critical reflection is the mechanism by which Dworkin’s view fulfils 
Walker’s second criterion, namely the requirement that a theory of autonomy is able to 
explain what makes a decision or choice autonomous. This is particularly valuable in 
bioethics, as it provides insight into how healthcare professionals can enhance patients’ 
capacity for autonomy. This is clearly evident in Walker’s problem cases, as each of her 
characters would likely benefit from some support in working through their process of 
                                                      
14 Alternative approaches might include preventive screening and lifestyle changes, although they could also 
include more targeted genetic testing 
20 
 
critical reflection. William, for example, might have some physical or logistical barriers to 
undertaking his treatment that are significant enough that they override his desire to secure 
the benefits of adhering to his therapy regime. Helping him to overcome these is an 
important way that his healthcare team could support him to exercise his capacity for 
autonomy. Similarly, in Tim’s situation his healthcare provider should be able to recognize 
that his refusal of treatment is not consistent with his long term or higher-order desires and 
preferences, and accordingly might seek ways to support him to come to a decision that is 
more authentically aligned with his goals. These examples show that a broader 
understanding of autonomy such as Dworkin’s procedural approach can be useful in applied 
scenarios and can provide practical guidance as to how health professionals can support 
patients to exercise their autonomy. 
 
Relational Autonomy 
Incorporating a relational element into a conception of autonomy is a way of 
strengthening procedural accounts, and is consistent with a Dworkian approach. Some 
procedural theories of autonomy have been the subject of feminist critiques that argue that 
the focus solely on the particular patient’s situation and their process of critical reflection is 
fundamentally individualistic (see for example Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, Donchin 2000, 
Dodds 2000). A focus on the individual provides insufficient recognition of an agent’s social 
and relational context, and how these factors bear on their capacity for autonomy. 
Furthermore, procedural accounts can also fail to identify social oppression that could 
undermine autonomy. Donchin (2000) emphasizes two relational dimensions to autonomy. 
One is in the context of the patient-physician relationship, which is inherently interpersonal; 
with all the attendant complexities of power and communication. Manson and O’Neill’s 
explanation of the communicative interchanges in which medical decision making takes 
place captures this relationality. However, Donchin also points out that in order to 
safeguard patients’ autonomy it is also important to pay attention to their macro societal 
influences and how these can affect their choices. She explains that people exist 
fundamentally in relation to others, so all that we do takes place in this social context. 
Further, the activities involved in exercising autonomy – such as reflecting, planning, 
choosing, deciding – are themselves social activities that often involve others or are done in 
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ways that are subject to influence by our relationships and social context. Family 
relationships can be particularly pertinent to medical decision making, as family members’ 
lives can often be impacted significantly by healthcare choices. 
The relationality that comes from being part of a family has an added dimension of 
relevance in genomics, given that genetic information is shared within families. Results of a 
genetic test can reveal significant implications for other family members. The negative 
obligations by which patient autonomy is respected on the default account involve 
refraining from coercing or otherwise unduly influencing patients, and ensuring they are 
properly informed to consent to medical interventions. However the default conception 
makes no reference to the patient’s family members.15 The default conception of autonomy 
does not factor in how the patient’s family and social context can work either to enhance or 
undermine their autonomy. 
In contrast, the process of critical reflection that Dworkin outlines can incorporate 
consideration of the patient’s social and relational context, specifically as it affects their 
preference-formation and decision making processes. The process of critical reflection is 
socially situated, as are a person’s values, goals and preferences. When undertaking the 
kind of critical reflection necessary to adjust or accept one’s first-order preferences in light 
of higher-order values and goals, people will engage in discussions with family members or 
trusted friends, health and medical professionals, as well as reflecting upon the broader 
social dimensions of their life such as their housing or employment situation, which could 
impact treatment decisions. In this way, a procedural account of autonomy provides a 
mechanism by which the relational dimensions of autonomy can be incorporated. This is 
important in all medical decision making, but especially so in the context of genomics. In the 
example of the woman seeking genomic testing due to a family history of various cancers, if 
a mutation had been found in a relative this would have implications for her. Iterative 
decision making processes are fundamentally embedded in the person’s social situation, 
and their relationships help to determine and refine their higher-order preferences and 
                                                      
15 This is not to argue that providers of genetic or genomic testing do not themselves account for family 
members. Indeed, this is a standard aspect of the pre-test consent process. But it is not reflected in the 
accounts of autonomy that are predominantly used in genetics and genomics literature. 
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values. Understood in this way, procedural accounts of autonomy such as Dworkin’s can 
incorporate the relational aspects of autonomy. 
 
Procedural Autonomy Beyond Dworkin 
There are several advantages to a Dworkian account of autonomy in bioethics. 
However, the hierarchical nature of the endorsement process has been considered 
problematic. In other words, the process of critically reflecting on one’s first-order 
preferences and goals in relation to second-order preferences and goals does not stop, 
potentially, at the second-order level. Further reflection on these preferences is required in 
relation to higher-order goals, and so on. Beauchamp and Childress (among others) object 
to the ‘split-level’ nature of Dworkin’s account and similar accounts of autonomy which 
require endorsement of first-order desires by second-order ones. The objection centers on 
the requirement for higher-order preferences and values that inform a person’s capacity to 
reflect critically upon their first-order preferences and desires, and they argue that such a 
requirement leads to an infinite regress. Paradoxically, this would then limit autonomy. 
However we contend that a reflective process of authentication – understood 
differently to the validation by higher-order preferences – can be a way of ending the 
regress. For a person to feel that their (first-order) preferences or desires are authentically 
theirs, they require the capacity for some sort of reflection on how these immediate desires 
cohere and align with their well established and tested beliefs, values and preferences. If a 
former smoker experiences a sudden desire for a cigarette, she can reflect on her desire for 
good health, her associated preference not to be a smoker and recall how she came to this 
via the experience of quitting smoking. Weighing up the current desire against her more 
established preferences, she can make the decision not to smoke at this moment. The 
higher-order goals or preferences do not require validation by other goals, but rather can be 
deemed by a person to be authentically theirs by a process of rational reflection that does 
not necessarily appeal to higher-order values, but can examine the substance or content of 
the desires or preferences. Juth (2005) explains that authenticity requires a person to have a 
positive attitude towards the desire (such as acceptance or approval), and this needs to 
incorporate an understanding of how they came to have the desire. In the case of the 
former smoker, she does not have a positive attitude towards her desire to smoke now, in 
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part because she understands that it is provoked by an addictive response. She adjusts this 
first-order desire in light of this understanding as well as her higher-order goals for good 
health, and therefore authentically identifies with the desire not to smoke. The higher-order 
goal for good health do not require further authentication, because by examining the 
substance of this goal she can confirm its authenticity without appealing to other values16. 
When this confirmation is considered alongside the understanding of what prompted the 
desire to smoke, the first-order desire to smoke can be exposed as inauthentic. The 
requirement for authenticity is one way to break the potential infinite regress of goals and 
preferences. 
While procedural accounts have many advantages over the default conception of 
autonomy, they are content neutral. That is, these accounts do not refer to the content or 
substance of what the goal or preference is about, and as such it is not possible to 
determine their authenticity. To be able to determine whether they have a positive attitude 
towards a goal or desire, the person needs to understand the process by which they came 
to have it and whether it is truly theirs. In order to make this assessment, reflection on the 
process is insufficient. To use Rebecca Walker’s term, no “black box” (Walker 2008 595) 
account of autonomy – namely one that focuses only on the characteristics of the patient 
(as competent) and the process by which the preference came about – can adequately meet 
her criteria. In order to identify actions which are not made autonomously, reference also 
needs to be made to the content of the goals, preferences and desires that lead to those 
actions. A content neutral conception of autonomy (which also includes the default 
conception, as it ensures autonomy by implementing informed consent procedures) does 
not enable the right kind of reflection upon a person’s immediate and long-held desires, 
goals and preferences that is needed to ensure their autonomy. Another significant problem 
that Walker identifies with black box theories of autonomy is that they fail to provide a 
moral imperative to respect patient autonomy. If autonomy comes down to certain 
characteristics of the patient and the process by which they come to a decision, this does 
not offer any compelling reason why that decision ought to be respected. Hence we will 
                                                      
16 It could be argued that the goal of good health is underpinned by a desire for a conception of a “good life” 
or a desire to maximize flourishing. However, in many cases an agent can cease the regress at the goal of good 
health because by reflecting on the content of this preference it can be determined to be authentic without 
need for further consideration. 
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now turn to a substantive conception of autonomy that incorporates a Razian perfectionist 
approach and assess how such an account can address the content issue. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE PERFECTIONIST AUTONOMY 
So far we have followed Rebecca Walker’s critique of the default conception of 
autonomy in bioethics, and have argued that a Dworkian procedural account of autonomy 
goes some way to addressing her three criteria that an account of autonomy must fulfil. 
However, the outstanding problem for both these accounts is their inability to account for 
some scenarios in which autonomy fails, as they do not require agents to reflect upon the 
content or substance of their goals and preferences, as long as the correct procedure has 
been followed. We will now outline a substantive, perfectionist account of autonomy that 
incorporates the notion of normative competence, and show how such an approach 
addresses Walker’s criteria and also can be of practical use in applied bioethics. 
 
Razian Perfectionism 
Some recent papers in the bioethical literature have referred to a perfectionist 
understanding of autonomy as a broader conception which is beneficial for considerations 
in bioethics (see for example (Vayena 2015, Blasimme and Vayena 2016)). Perfectionism as 
a moral theory directs us to pursue the best possible human life. There are variations of the 
theory that have different definitions of ‘a good human life’ (or perfection) but it is typically 
considered to be an objective standard and one that we should care about promoting for all 
people, not just ourselves. In order to live an excellent human life, it might be argued, one 
must have the capacity to reflect upon and determine one’s own goals and preferences and 
to have those preferences respected wherever feasible. Since perfectionism depends upon 
an objective understanding of excellence as a measure of human lives, the determination of 
whether a person’s goals and values are perfection-promoting necessarily requires 
consideration of the content of their beliefs and attitudes, not merely the procedure by 
which they came about.  
A key proponent of perfectionism is Joseph Raz, a political philosopher who 
conceptualizes autonomy in the context of his moral account of freedom (Raz 1986). Raz 
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identifies three elements that comprise the conditions for autonomy: appropriate mental 
abilities; an adequate range of options; and independence (p. 372). The latter refers to 
freedom from coercion and undue manipulation, which is a prevalent feature of many 
accounts of autonomy. In the first condition – appropriate mental abilities – Raz includes 
not just competence but also the ability to understand what is required to achieve one’s 
goals, and undertake actions that will lead to their attainment.  
In order to make meaningful choices that will lead to the attainment of goals and the 
best possible life, (as with the procedural account of autonomy) there must be a suitable 
range of options between which to choose. However the perfectionist account goes further 
too. In describing the range of options, Raz explains a number of factors that contribute to 
their adequacy. One important consideration is that the options should range over both 
choices with long range, significant consequences, as well as those that seem trivial. In other 
words, we should be able to exercise our autonomy both in terms of developing and 
pursuing longer term significant goals – such as our occupation, personal relationships, and 
so on – but we also need to have some control over the smaller day-to-day decisions, such 
as when to wash, what to wear, the route we take to work, and so on. He also points out 
that the quality of the options matters more than the quantity, which concurs with 
Dworkin’s contention that more choices are not necessarily better. There is little value – nor 
contribution to our self-determination – if we can choose between hundreds of nearly 
identical houses in practically identical locations. A far preferable range of options is 
between either a small flat in the inner city, or a larger house in a suburb further from the 
city center. This smaller range of options represents a more genuine choice, because the 
option chosen will make a significant difference to the subject’s life.  
A Razian perfectionist account of autonomy also needs to assess the content or 
substance of the available choices. It is not possible to determine whether they represent an 
adequate or meaningful range based on their number or the processes by which they were 
generated, because their content (what they are about) matters in this determination. In 
order to know whether a given range of options have the capacity to improve the quality 
(increase the perfection) of a person’s life, it is necessary to examine the substance of the 
options themselves. We now return to Rebecca Walker’s argument for the requirement of 
substantiveness, namely that we must know what the actions and decisions are about in 
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order to make a determination as to whether they constitute an exercise of autonomy (or 
not), and also to explain why they ought to be respected. 
 
Black boxes and normative competence 
The requirement for an adequate range of options – where their quality is more 
important than how many options there are – is a factor that cannot be assessed without 
knowing the content of the options. In other words, we cannot know if a range of options is 
adequate without looking inside the black box. No amount of scrutiny of the process by 
which the options or choices were arrived at can determine their value or adequacy, 
because we need to know what they are about in order to make that assessment. Rebecca 
Walker’s criteria pick up on this requirement, because so-called ‘black box’ accounts of 
autonomy cannot account for a moral requirement to respect it. Her counterexamples also 
show that the substance of people’s preferences is relevant to determining whether they 
represent an exercise of autonomy. 
Some failures to exercise autonomy – such as those introduced by Rebecca Walker 
as counterexamples to the default conception of autonomy – involve a lack of ‘normative 
competence’. This is a neo-Kantian notion that refers to a failure to identify norms and 
decide whether or not to apply them in the context of one’s decision making. Wolf (Wolf 
1993) explains that normative competence is the capacity for individuals to evaluate 
different available options based on their normative content, and make better or worse 
choices. The notion that ‘some choices are better than others’ implies a universal standard 
of morality. However it is our contention that this is compatible with value pluralism. While 
the topics of universal morality and value pluralism are beyond the scope of this paper, as 
Wolf points out it is not necessary to commit to the existence of “a unique, universally 
applicable, complete, and optimal system of values” (p. 124) in order to allow for some 
universal comparisons of the relative value of different choices. 
Take for example Walker’s problem case Desiree, who approaches a plastic surgeon 
despite her strong feminist ideals and belief that plastic surgery is “an unacceptable 
acquiescence to male dominated social norms” (p. 598). While Desiree is otherwise 
autonomous and is capable of undertaking a process of critical reflection, she lacks 
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sufficient normative competence to evaluate the social norms causing her to choose to 
approach the surgeon. If she did, she would understand that her action is caused by an 
internalized social norm (a desire to conform to a certain standard of attractiveness), and 
because of this etiology of the desire she would know that another choice would be better 
for her by virtue of being more consistent with her overall beliefs and values. 
Similarly, when healthy individuals purchase whole genome sequencing through 
direct-to-consumer providers, they are arguably responding to the rhetoric of individual 
empowerment currently used to market such tests, and misunderstandings about their 
potential impact. In order to exercise their autonomy effectively they need to reflect 
critically on the limits and drawbacks of the test, and how obtaining it might align (or not) 
with their broader goals. 
What this means for the concept of autonomy is that the normative competence of 
the subject is significant in order to meet Walker’s criteria. It is useful and important for 
identifying actions that are not autonomous and explaining what makes choices or actions 
autonomous, even though a refined procedural account of autonomy that takes the 
person’s social and relational context into account would (arguably) go a long way towards 
meeting those criteria. However, in order to explain why we have an obligation to respect 
autonomous choices it is necessary to consider the content of the action or decision. 
Walker considers different varieties of internal controls that can have an impact on 
our decision making. She points out that all choices or actions are controlled, but some 
kinds of control are autonomy-undermining and others are not. Even when an autonomous 
person chooses freely and authentically their action or decision is controlled by their own 
values, desires, and so on. For example, a person might choose to access a genomic test 
because she identifies as a person who seeks information and embraces technology. In this 
case, the controls on her decision making are internal, but they are features of herself that 
she identifies with and embraces, and therefore she acts autonomously when she makes 
that decision. What is important in order to distinguish autonomous from non-autonomous 
choices, Walker claims, is that the right kind of relationship has to exist between the self (or 
will) and the person’s choices. The nature of this connection, or “the core features of self-
rule” (Walker 2008 604) is what an adequate theory of autonomy must explain. This is not a 
black box procedural understanding of autonomy because the relationship between the self 
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and the choices cannot be formed without reference to the content of the choices and the 
person’s sense of self. 
The internal controls which impact on the choices made by the people in each of 
Walker’s three examples are not identified with by each of the people who make the 
decisions. They represent failures of the self (as authentically identified with by the person) 
to express itself in the individual’s actions. In order to determine whether the controls that 
affect an autonomous person’s decision making process support or undermine their 
autonomy, it is necessary to have access to the content of both the decision and the 
person’s goals and values as relevant to the decision. To make this determination requires a 
degree of normative competence. Walker gives the example of actions from love – such as 
snatching one’s child to save them from a hazardous situation – as actions that are 
controlled by something that necessitates action and is fully controlled (in the sense that 
the person has no other option but to act in that way), but does not undermine the person’s 
autonomy. This is because loving their child is a feature of the person that they accept and 
embrace as part of their identity. However on a black box procedural account of autonomy 
it is not possible to distinguish internal controls that undermine autonomy from those that 
do not. What matters, for Walker, is whether the person accepts or rejects a particular 
influence, the determination of which requires them to exercise their normative 
competence. Doing so can involve making quite subtle distinctions, and contributes to the 
difficulty of applying such an account of autonomy to scenarios in practice. 
 
Requirements of Autonomy in Bioethics 
Up to this point we have argued that a substantive, perfectionist account of 
autonomy which requires an assessment of the person’s normative competence can 
effectively meet Walker’s criteria for a theory of autonomy. This approach can identify 
actions that are not autonomous, and explains why actions or decisions are considered 
autonomous, even in situations where there are fairly subtle controls influencing the 
decision process. It also fulfils Walker’s third requirement, which is that an account of 
autonomy must explain the normative requirement to respect autonomy. Identifying 
autonomy as self-rule – or requiring a capacity for normative competence in autonomous 
persons – accounts for the moral dimension to autonomy, as it is via this connection 
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between the self and their actions that a person can exercise their capacity for morality. It is 
by exercising this appropriate form of self-rule that people can act as moral agents, and this 
provides a normative justification for respecting that self-rule, or the autonomy of the 
person. 
However, for a theory of autonomy to be relevant and useful in bioethics it must 
also have the capacity to be applied in practice. Walker contends that what she terms a 
conceptually adequate account of autonomy becomes more difficult to implement in 
practice. While the analysis of the appropriate connection between a person’s authentic self 
and the rational determination of their will might offer insight into whether or not they are 
exercising their autonomy in making a particular choice, this does not necessarily offer a 
reason to respect that choice in instances where they have not acted autonomously. Walker 
clarifies two levels at which this kind of a theory poses challenges in terms of 
implementation. In the first instance, identifying when there is a failure of self-rule – such as 
weakness of will, irrationality, and so on – is not a procedural matter, but requires an 
exploration of the patient’s underlying values, goals and preferences and the process of 
arriving at the decision in question. Furthermore, even if the success or failure of self-rule 
with respect to a particular decision could be reliably determined – which is highly unlikely – 
this does not offer a reason to interfere with or overrule an otherwise autonomous person’s 
decision. 
While it is true that a broader conception of autonomy does not lend itself to 
procedural implementation in the form of informed consent or similar formal processes, we 
argue that such a view can nonetheless be extremely useful in practical application. To show 
how a broader conception of autonomy can be practically applied, we will draw on Manson 
and O’Neill’s agency account of information and communication (Manson and O'Neill 2007), 
which represents a shift away from the misconceptions that arise from the metaphors we 
use about information. Such metaphors have the effect of obscuring the communicative and 
epistemic norms that underpin the interactions between patients and clinicians in which 
informed consent is sought. Going back to Walker’s requirements for an adequate 
conception of autonomy (the ability to identify non-autonomous actions; explain what 
makes actions or choices autonomous; and account for why we have a moral obligation to 
respect autonomy), an account that is based on a level of normative competence requires 
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just such an awareness of communicative and epistemic norms in order to determine 
whether a decision has been made autonomously. To clarify this claim, we will highlight 
some key features of Manson and O’Neill’s ‘agency model’ of communication and argue 
that understanding clinical interactions on this model will help health professionals to 
implement a broader notion of patients’ autonomy. The model of communication they 
describe shows how professionals in a busy healthcare system can proactively work to 
enhance patients’ autonomy. 
Manson and O’Neill (Manson and O'Neill 2007) reconceptualize informed consent in 
terms of what they call an agency model of communication, which draws attention to the 
characteristics of communication in a medical decision making context and how such 
interactions can be approached in order to maximize the patient’s capacity for autonomy. 
They draw attention to various metaphors at work in the prevailing model of informed 
consent, and propose an alternative understanding. According to Manson and O’Neill, the 
prevailing approach to informed consent is based on a distorted understanding of the 
nature of information and how we communicate. They emphasize that informing and 
communicating are actions and interactions that can only take place against the backdrop of 
a normative framework that underpins those interactions. They describe what they call the 
conduit and container metaphors which imply that information is a substance or ‘stuff’ that 
can be created, held, and transferred between people and places. These metaphors 
emphasize the content of communications at the expense of focusing on the acts involved. 
The emphasis on content obscures several key features of the acts in which communication 
take place.  
Of particular relevance to how we understand autonomy in healthcare, 
communicating and informing are actions that depend fundamentally on the audience and 
the context in which they take place. A doctor explaining her patient’s genetic condition will 
communicate in a very specific manner when talking to him. If she were explaining the same 
patient case at a conference to an audience of medical peers, she would communicate very 
differently. The conduit and container metaphors also tend to obscure the fact that 
informing occurs against a backdrop of certain epistemic and ethical norms. If either the 
speaker or the audience fails to adhere to these norms then communication cannot happen. 
The conduit metaphor about informing causes us to overlook these aspects of 
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communicative interactions and “downplays the complex social and normative framework 
that must be in place and must be respected for effective communication” (p. 49).  
By contrast, Manson and O’Neill’s agency model of communicative transfers 
acknowledges that both the speaker and the audience have various commitments of their 
own (what they know, understand, need, desire, and so on) but also share a normative 
structure that allows communication to take place. The normative structure includes 
language but also things like a belief that the other person is not seeking to mislead them, 
that they will follow through on their promises, and so on. In the healthcare setting, the 
patient needs not only to understand that the doctor has sufficient medical knowledge to 
explain their condition accurately, but also that they will tell the truth, apply their 
understanding of the condition to determine the most appropriate treatment, seeks the 
best outcome for their patient, etc. Similarly, the doctor needs to think that the patient is 
telling the truth about their symptoms, will volunteer any relevant information, and so on. 
Manson and O’Neill point out that when we acknowledge all the relevant implicit 
knowledge and context that underpins any communication, the notion of providing ‘full 
disclosure’ becomes nonsense.  
Such an understanding of communicative interactions between patients (and their 
families) and healthcare professionals aligns well with a substantive, perfectionist account 
of autonomy and shows how such a conception of autonomy can be implemented, even in 
busy healthcare settings. By drawing attention to the assumptions and implicit knowledge 
that underpins any communicative interaction, healthcare professionals can be more 
attuned to when it might be helpful to make certain assumptions explicit, or when a patient 
might require further exploration or explanation of an aspect of their care. Consider Juth’s 
(2005) suggestion that one of the ways a person can fail to be autonomous is if their desires 
are not authentically theirs – which also reflects Rebecca Walker’s counterexamples. Take 
her example of William who does not follow through with his physiotherapy after knee 
surgery. If a health professional can identify his underlying beliefs (that physiotherapy will 
be effective in facilitating his recovery) and desires (for a full and speedy recovery), they can 
intervene – in the form of asking some contextual questions – to determine if there are 
other barriers such as logistical ones that might be undermining his autonomy. Health 
professionals are in a position to help patients such as William to resolve their failures of 
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self-rule. The patient’s autonomy can be enhanced by communicative interactions which 
have a purpose – such as increasing someone’s understanding of something, or wanting to 
bring about (or clarify) a person’s attitude to something – and are responsive to offering 
rational evidence that is sensitive to the audience receiving it. A flexible and adaptive 
approach like this can be adapted to enhance patients’ autonomy in many applied medical 
scenarios, and is particularly relevant when considering contexts such as genomic medicine 
where there is a great deal of complexity and uncertainty. An interesting consideration 
which is beyond the scope of this paper would be to apply this understanding of autonomy 
to different medical decision making scenarios, both clinical and in a research context. We 
see the potential to apply this kind of approach as new models of consent are proposed in 
genomics, to foster a more flexible and adaptive form of communication (Kost, Poppel, and 
Coller 2017). If the healthcare practitioner seeks to increase the patient’s understanding of 
the proposed intervention in a way that responds in reference to the patient’s values and 
goals, they can enhance the patient’s capacity to exercise their autonomy. In this way, 
Manson and O’Neill’s agency model of communication can support the practical application 
of a substantive, perfectionist conception of autonomy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that how we conceptualize autonomy matters in bioethics, and that 
it can be of practical relevance in applied scenarios. Following Rebecca Walker’s critique of 
the default conception of autonomy, we have showed that conflating autonomy with 
informed consent is problematic and that bioethics benefits from a broader understanding 
of autonomy which draws on the moral philosophical literature. Genomic medicine in 
particular is an area that highlights why it is unhelpful to emphasize provision of 
information. It is our contention that a substantive, perfectionist account of autonomy is the 
most relevant and useful for bioethics, and that the notion of normative competence – the 
capacity for individuals to reflect upon their available choices in relation to their values, 
goals and preferences – is important to show why health professionals have a moral 
obligation to foster patients’ autonomy. An agency model of communication provides 
practical guidance for how this conception of autonomy can be fostered proactively in 
healthcare settings. 
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